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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONTRAGTS-R.ATIFICATION AND ESTOPPEL IN 
CONTRACTS MADE BY UNAUTHORIZED AGENT-Plaintiff's infant daughter, 
admitted to Newark City Hospital as an emergency case,1 received hos-
pitalization and medical treatment worth $1,190 during her seventy-day 
period of confinement. The medical director of the hospital had made an 
agreement with the Hospital Service Plan of New Jersey which provided 
that regardless of the amount or quality of the hospitalization required, 
payment of the flat sum of $100 for any subscriber-patient would constitute 
payment in full to the city. The city accepted the $100 check paid by the 
Plan as billed by the hospital for the care of the child. In order to facilitate 
settlement with the person whose alleged negligence had caused his daugh-
ter's injuries, by removing the city's hospital lien for the balance of the 
charges for treatment, plaintiff sued for a declaratory judgment absolving 
him of any liability to the city. The real contest having evolved between 
1 The hospital, a public institution owned by the municipality, was principally 
dedicated to the care of indigents, ,but under an ordinance enacted in 1937 could treat 
non-indigents in emergencies. 
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the city and the Plan,2 the trial court rendered judgment for the Plan 
ordering cancellation of the lien. On certification to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, held, affirmed, one justice dissenting without opinion. 
Even assuming that the medical director was without authorization to 
consummate the agreement, the city is bound by its subsequent course of 
conduct3 which impliedly ratified the contract, and is also estopped to 
deny its validity. Johnson v. Hospital Service Plan of N. ·J., (N.J. 1957) 
135 A. (2d) 483. 
Since municipal co:r;porations derive their contractual powers exclusively 
from statute and charter,4 it is uniformly held that no recovery may be 
had against a municipality on a contract truly ultra vires,5 on theories of 
ratification6 or estoppel to deny its validity,7 or in quasi-contract.8 Because 
any ratification must be performed in the same manner in which the con-
tract could originally have been validly executed, contracts which are 
within the general powers of the municipality but invalid for failure to 
observe mandatory statutory conditions precedent in the mode or manner 
of formation generally may not be validated by ratification or estoppel.11 
2 In the lower court an agreed statement of facts was drawn, stipulating that under 
no circumstances would plaintiff be liable for the sum involved. 
3 There was strong evidence that the proper municipal officer knew in detail of 
the agreement and acquiesced in its continuation despite a provision permitting termina-
tion. Further proof of implied ratification lay in the receipts found in the financial reports 
of the hospital of sums which had been accepted under the agreement, and exposure 
at hearings on the city budget of the operation of the contract. 
4See 10 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §29.05 (1950). 
5 Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 349 (1870). A truly ultra vires contract 
is most commonly defined as one which it is not within the powers of the municipality 
to make. The confusing distinction, adhered to by New Jersey, is sometimes made between 
contracts ultra vires in the "primary sense" as above defined and those ultra vires in the 
"secondary sense," defined as within the power of the municipality to make but 
irregularly or defectively executed. See Summer Cottagers' Assn. v. Cape May, 19 N.J. 
493, 117 A. (2d) 585 (1955); Bell v. Kirkland, 102 Minn. 213, 113 N.W. 271 (1907). Ratifica-
tion and estoppel are applicable to contracts ultra vires in the secondary sense. Bauer 
v. Newark, 7 N.J. 426, 81 A. (2d) 727 (1951). 
6 Cedar Rapids Water Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 118 Iowa 234, 91 N.W. 1081 (1902); 
Oakland v. Key System, 64 Cal. App. (2d) 427, 149 P. (2d) 195 (1944). 
7 West Tennessee Power & Light Co. v. Jackson, (6th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 979; 
Gontrum v. Baltimore, (Md. Ct. App. 1943) 35 A. (2d) 128. 
s Fort Edward v. Fish, 156 N.Y. 363, 50 N.E. 973 (1898). Although not here considered, 
the quasi-contractual liability of municipal corporations is closely interrelated with the 
doctrines of ratification and estoppel. See generally Tooke, "Quasi-Contractual Liability 
of Municipal Corporations," 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1143 (1934); Antieau, "The Contractual 
and Quasi-Contractual Responsibilities of Municipal Corporations," 2 Sr. LOUIS L. J. 
230 (1953). See also Shulse v. Mayville, 223 Wis. 624, 271 N.W. 643 (1937); American 
La France & F. I. v. Borough of Shenandoah, (3d Cir. 1940) 115 F. (2d) 866. 
9 Denial of recovery based on ratification: Paul v. Seattle, 40 ·wash. 294, 82 P. 601 
(1905) (necessity for ordinance); Indianapolis v. Wann, 144 Ind. 175, 42 N.E. 901· (1895) 
(necessity for prior appropriations); Tobin v. Town Council, 45 Wyo. 219, 17 P. (2d) 
666 (1933) (necessity for advertisement for bids); Arnott v. Spokane, 6 Wash. 442, 33 P. 
1063 (1893) (necessity that the contract be in writing). But see City Affairs Committee v. 
Jersey City, 134 N.J.L. 180, 46 A. (2d) 425 (1946), where it was held that a contract 
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The rationale behind the denial of recovery in these instances is that these 
statutory limitations, which exist for the protection of the liabilities of tax-
payers against the unwarranted assumption of municipal authority, must 
not be annulled by inclirectly and retroactively enforcing void or inherently 
invalid contracts.10 Since all who contract with a municipality are charged 
with notice of the nature and scope of the authority of its officers and 
agents,11 contracts executed by an unauthorized municipal agent are in-
valid.12 It is settled, however, that if as in the principal case the sole defect 
is of this nature,13 the contract is subject to e~forcement by application of 
ratification and estoppel theories.14 In such cases conduct constituting 
ratification or permitting use of estoppel against the municipal corporation 
should make the contract enforceable, since, as explained in the principal 
case,15 the taxpayers are not thereby disserved as there is nothing inherently 
invalid in the nature of the contract. Ratification, which operates by re-
lating back to validate the original contract,16 may be direct, e.g., by pas-
sage of an authorizing ordinance or resolution,17 or by implication from 
conduct indicative of the intention to ratify,18 but must be by the agency 
invalid for failure of an appropriation may be ratified by the subsequent making of the 
required appropriation. Denial of recovery based on estoppel: Mullins v. Kansas City, 
268 .Mo. 444, 188 S. W. 193 (1916). An emergency may justify recovery despite non-
compliance with statutory requirements. Los Angeles Dredging Co. v. Long Beach, 210 
Cal. 348, 291 P. 839 (1930). When the statutory requirements are classified as "directory" 
as distinct from the above examples of "mandatory" requirements, recovery is permitted. 
Edwards v. Kirkwood, 147 Mo. App. 599, 127 S.W. 378 (1910); Hansen v. Town of 
Anthon, 187 Iowa 51, 173 N.W. 939 (1919). Recovery has sometimes been based on the 
tenuous distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions. See City of 
Staples v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 196 Minn. 303, 265 N.W. 58 (1936). 
10 Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96 (1862). 
11 Potts v. Utica, (2d Cir. 1936) 86 F. (2d) 616. 
12 Jameison v. Paducah, 195 Ky. 71, 241 S.W. 327 (1922). 
13 T:he city conceded in the principal case that: (1) the contract was within the 
general scope of its powers as authorized by N.J. Stat. Ann. (1952) §17:48-7; and (2) there 
had been no failure to comply with the requisite statutory conditions precedent in the 
formation of the contract. While the trial court had held that the hospital medical 
director was in fact the proper official to execute the contract, the Supreme Court 
declined to rule on that issue, placing its decision entirely on ratification and estoppel. 
14 Pontiac v. Ducharme, 278 Mich. 474, 270 N.W. 754 (1936) (ratification); Barnard 
8: Co. v. County of Sangamon, 190 Ill. 116, 60 N.E. 109 (1901) (estoppel). But cf. Frank 
v. Board of Education of Jersey City, 90 N.J.L. 273 at 280, 100 A. 211 (1917), where it 
was stated: "Agency ,by estoppel has no proper place in the law of municipal corporations." 
15 Principal case at 486. 
16 In re Settlement of Hanson, 206 Minn. 371, 288 N.W. 706 (1939); Fruchtl v. Foley, 
(Fla. 1956) 84 S. (2d) 906. 
11 Ogden City v. Weaver, (8th Cir. 1901) 108 F. 564. 
18 Ratajczak v. Board of Education of Perth Amboy, ll4 N.J.L. 577, 177 A. 880 
(1935); Town of Bruce v. Dickey, ll6 Ill. 527, 6 N:E. 435 (1886). But see Shulse v. 
Mayville, note 8 supra, at 634, where Rosenberry, C.J., said, "It must be held ·that where 
there is no formal ratification there is no ratification at all. Ratification by acquiescence 
permits the city to become liable on a contractual basis in a manner other than that 
specified by statute." 
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originally empowered to make the contract,19 with full knowledge of the 
material facts.20 While any conduct of either an affirmative or negative 
character,21 with the requisite knowledge and indicative of an intent to 
recognize the obligation, can constitute implied ratification, the doctrine 
has frequently been indiscriminately applied by courts seeking to bind a 
municipality for goods or services rendered under an invalid contract.22 
The doctrine of estoppel in pais, by which a municipality acting with 
knowledge of the facts to recognize a contract made by an improper agent 
is precluded by a change of position in reliance on such action from denying 
the validity of the contract, is closely allied with ratification in its applica-
tion.23 A sound basis for estopping the municipality existed in the principal 
case, for the Plan over a period of eleven years had paid benefits to the 
city in reliance on the validity of the agreement.24 In many cases, however, 
estoppel has been invoked merely to indicate the legal effect of ratification, 
i.e., that having ratified a contract, the municipality is estopped to deny 
its validity.25 While, as in the principal case, the same course of action 
frequently gives rise to both ratification and estoppel, each has been correct-
ly applied as an independent ground for enforcing a municipal contract,26 
19 Ramsey v. City of Kissimmee, 139 Fla. 107, 190 S. 474 (1939); Brann v. City of 
Ellsworth, 137 Me. 316, 19 A. (2d) 425 (1941). 
20 Corpus Christi v. Johnson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 54 S.W. (2d) 865; Board of 
Education v. Montgomery, 177 Okla. 423, 60 P. (2d) 752 (1936). It has been held that 
knowledge possessed by the individual members of the city council does not constitute 
knowledge by the body as a whole. Texarkana v. Friedell, 82 Ark. 531, 102 S.W. 374 (1907). 
21 Vermuele v. Corning, 186 App. Div. 206, 174 N.Y.S. 220 (1919) (affirmative, payment 
of bills on the contract after notification); Stockwell v. Sioux Falls, 68 S.D. 157, 299 N.W. 
453 (1941) (affirmative, purchase pursuant to invalid option agreement); Town of Brice 
v. Dickey, 116 Ill. 527, 6 N.E. 435 (1886) (negative, failure to object to services rendered); 
Norwalk Gaslight Co. v. Borough of Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495 (1893) (negative, silence 
when duty to deny authority). But cf. Service Commercial Body ·works v. Borough of 
Dumont, 5 N.J. Super. 327, 68 A. (2d) 892 (1949). 
22 City of Conyers v. Kirk & Co., 78 Ga. 480, 3 S.E. 442 (1887); City of Staples v. 
Minnesota Power & Light Co., note 9 supra; Day v. City of Malvern, 195 Ark. 804, ll4 
s:w. (2d) 459 (1938). But cf. Giant Mfg. Co. v. City of Wamego, (Kan. 1935) 41 P. (2d) 
744. 
23 10 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §29.103, p. 415 (1950): "The 
rules as to ratification of corporate contracts and estoppel to deny the validity of such 
contracts being so interwoven, and the exact division line between ratification and 
estoppel in many cases being so shadowy, it is deemed preferable to treat these two 
together." 
24 Principal case at 488. In addition the Plan relied to its detriment on the agree-
ment's validity in those cases where it paid the city $100 when the value of the services 
rendered was less. 
25 B.F. Goodrich Rubber Co. v. Collinsville, (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 101 S.W. (2d) 
583; Greeley v. Evansville, (7th Cir. 1939) 128 F. (2d) 824. 
26 Moore v. Hupp, 17 Idaho 232, 105 P. 209 (1909) (ratification). Samuel v. Wildwood, 
47 N.J. Super. 162, 135 A. (2d) 583 (1957) (estoppel). Since in theory ratification itself 
validates the original contract, to apply estoppel merely to indicate the binding effect 
of acts of ratification would seem superfluous. But see BIGELOW, EsroPPEL, 6th ed., 493 
(1913): "It is common enough at present to speak of acquiescence and ratification as an 
estoppel. Neither the one nor the other, however, can be more than part of an estoppel, 
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and the court in the principal case is to be commended for applying each 
on its own separate, self-sufficient analytical basis. 
Edward M. Heppenstall 
at best. An estoppel is certain, being a legal inference or conclusion arising from acts or 
conduct; while acquiescence and ratification, like waiver, are but matters of fact which 
might have been found otherwise. Besides, the most that acquiescence or ratification 
can do, and this either may under certain circumstances do, is to supply an element 
necessary to the estoppel, and othenvise wanting, as e.g. knowledge of the facts at the 
time of making a representation." 
